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Abstract
Formal dialogue games studied by philosophers since the time of Aristotle have
recently found application in Articial Intelligence as the basis for protocols for in-
teractions between autonomous software agents. For instance, game protocols have
been proposed for agent dialogues involving team formation, persuasion, negotiation
and deliberation. There is yet, however, no formal, mathematical theory of dialogue
game protocols with which to compare two protocols or to study their formal prop-
erties. In this paper
1
, we present preliminary work towards such a theory, in which
we develop a geometric semantics for these protocols and, with it, dene a notion
of equivalence between two protocols. We then demonstrate an algebraic property
of protocol equivalence, and use this to show the non-equivalence of two similar
generic protocols. We also explore the relationship between nite and innite dia-
logues, motivated by the Ehrenfeucht-Frasse games of model theory. Our results
have implications for the design and evaluation of agent dialogue-game protocols.
KEYWORDS: Agent Communication Languages, Argumentation, Com-
putational Dialectics, Dialogue Games.
1 Introduction and Motivation
The concept of autonomous and intelligent software entities | agents | in-
teracting to jointly achieve some objective has become an inuential guiding
principle for recent research in Articial Intelligence (AI) [32]. A typical ap-
plication involves agents representing divergent interests, e.g., dierent net-
work elements in (say) a telecommunications or electricity network, seeking to
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negotiate use of a scarce resource. In these instances, economic auction mech-
anisms have provided powerful computational tools for operationalization of
negotiation interactions between agents [15]. An auction mechanism, however,
permits only limited information to be transmitted between its participants
| typically, only acceptances or rejections of oers at particular price lev-
els. Knowing the reasons for particular oers, and the reasons for or against
their acceptance, can enable participants to rene their oers or to propose
appropriate counter-oers. This additional information can thus potentially
increase the likelihood of the parties reaching resolution, and, if achieved, pos-
sibly reduce the average time or computational resources required. For this
reason, the use of argumentation, the philosophical theory of argument and
dialogue, has recently been proposed for interactions between autonomous
agents [26,29].
How might we operationalize argumentation in the design of agent inter-
action protocols? One approach has been the use of formal dialogue games.
These are interactions between two or more participants, where each \moves"
by uttering a locution, i.e. a spoken utterance, in conformance with some pre-
dened and commonly-known set of rules. A locution may, for example, be
an assertion of some claim by a speaker, or a question regarding an assertion
made by another speaker, or an argument for a claim in response to such a
question. The rules of the game specify the circumstances under which each
locution is permitted, or obligatory, or forbidden, and the circumstances under
which the dialogue terminates. Dialogue games date at least from the time of
Aristotle [3], and were extensively studied by philosophers in the Middle Ages
[11]. In modern times, they have been used for the contextual analysis of fal-
lacious reasoning [11,18], to provide a semantics for intuitionistic and classical
logic [17], and as a constructive proof-theory for statements in quantum logic
[25]. They dier from the games of economic game theory in that payos for
winning or losing a game are not considered, and because there is no use of
uncertainty measures, such as probabilities, to model the possible moves of
opponents. They also dier from the abstract games recently developed as a
semantics for programming languages in theoretical computer science [1], since
these latter games do not typically share the rich rule structure of dialogue
games, and are not intended to be implemented as interaction protocols.
In the multi-agent systems arena, dialogue games have been proposed as
the basis for protocols for several types of agent interactions, including: the
formation of teams and collective intention [4,5]; information-seeking dialogues
[14]; persuasion dialogues [22]; negotiations [2,24,28]; joint deliberations over
possible actions [12]; and joint determination of uncertain beliefs [22].
2
As an
example, we list below the nine locutions in a protocol for deliberation over
2
Note that some of these dialogue types are dened according to a standard argumentation
theory classication of human dialogues [30]. However, the work discussed in this paper is
unrelated to the use of dialogues games to explain or generate natural language conversations
in computational linguistics, as in [16].
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possible actions we have recently proposed [12]; this protocol implements a
philosophical model of human deliberation, called retroexive argumentation,
due to Harald Wohlrapp [31].
Locutions for a Deliberation Protocol
open dialogue(P
i
; q?)
enter dialogue(P
j
; q?)
propose(P
i
; type; t)
assert(P
i
; type; t)
prefer(P
i
; a; b)
move(P
i
; action; a)
retract(P
i
; locution)
ask justify(P
j
; P
i
; type; t)
withdraw dialogue(P
j
; q?)
where: P
i
; P
j
are agent identiers; q? is a question
concerning what is to be done in some situation; type is
one of the following categories of propositions: question,
goal, constraint, fact, perspective, action or evaluation;
and t; a; b are propositions [12].
However, these various agent protocols are essentially ad-hoc, with no for-
mal, unifying theory developed for them. Perhaps because of this, there has
been as yet no study of the properties of such protocols, either particularly or
in general, for example, whether they facilitate or hinder dialogue resolution;
or whether they are vulnerable to disruptive behaviour by participants (e.g.,
by asking the same question repeatedly). Consequently, designers of dialogue
game protocols currently have no guidance for issues such as:

How many locutions should there be?

What types of locutions should be included? (For example: assertions,
questions, etc.)

What are the appropriate rules for the combination of locutions?

When should behavior be forbidden, e.g., repeated utterance of one locu-
tion?

Under what conditions should dialogues be made to terminate?

When are dialogues conducted according to a particular protocol guaranteed
to terminate?

For dialogues guaranteed to terminate, how many locutions need to be ut-
tered for this to be achieved, i.e. what is the computational complexity of
a dialogue under a given protocol?
Similarly, as protocols proliferate, agents (or their human principals) intending
to use them will require guidance for issues such as:

When are two protocols the same? Dierent protocols may be dierent
3
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only in supercial details, and not in the formal properties they exhibit;
conversely, similar protocols may have very dierent properties.

How may dierent protocols be compared and how may these dierences be
measured?

Which protocols are to be preferred under which circumstances? (i.e., what
are their respective advantages and disadvantages?)

What is the formal relationship between dialogue game protocols and the
various generic agent communications languages which have been proposed,
e.g., the Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language (KQML) [19] or
Agent Communications Language of the Foundation for Intelligent Physical
Agents (FIPA) [9].

When are dialogue game protocols preferable to other forms of agent in-
teraction, such as auction mechanisms or general agent communications
languages?

What strategies are appropriate for an agent engaged in a dialogue under a
specic protocol?
These are important questions for designers and users of agent dialogue
game protocols. Answering them with rigor will require a formal language in
which to reason about the properties of protocols, and techniques with which
to compare one protocol with another. We believe that algebraic topological
methods may have great value in developing such a mathematical theory of
protocols, and this paper presents our preliminary investigations in this di-
rection. Our approach is to dene the elements of a generic dialogue game
protocol in such a way that we can translate any protocol into a geometric
representation, specically a subset of a real, multi-dimensional space. We
then dene a notion of equivalence of two protocols, and construct an alge-
braic invariant of this notion of equivalence. Because dialogues correspond to
time-directed paths in a euclidean space under our semantics, we have no no-
tion of inverse, and so this algebraic invariant is not a group structure. Thus
our work to date is in the spirit of algebraic topology without using anything
sophisticated mathematically.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reprises a formal model of
dialogue games from our previous work, and Section 3 denes our geometric
semantics for dialogue games protocols and for dialogues conducted according
to such games. Section 4 denes a topological notion of equivalence of two
protocols, and deduces an algebraic invariant of this notion. We then demon-
strate that two generic protocols which dier by only one locution are in fact
not equivalent. In Section 5 we explore the relationship between nite and
innite dialogues, using ideas motivated by the Ehrenfeucht-Frasse games of
model theory [13]. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 A Generic Dialogue-Game
Following our experiences in articulating the locutions and rules for a number
of agent dialogue game protocols, e.g., [2,22,24], we proposed the rst formal
model for a generic dialogue game [20,23]; we reprise this work here. In this
model, it is assumed that the topics of discussion between the participants are
represented in some logical language, whose well-formed formulae are denoted
by the lower-case Greek letters, , , etc. The dialogue game protocol then
includes several types of rules:
Commencement Rules: Rules which dene the circumstances under which
the dialogue begins.
Locutions: Rules which indicate what utterances are permitted. These rules
commonly dene the preconditions which must obtain before a locution can
be uttered by a participant, the legal syntax of the locution, and the re-
sponses which other participants are permitted to utter subsequently. For
instance, legal locutions may enable participants to assert propositions, al-
low others to question or contest prior assertions, and allow those asserting
propositions which are subsequently questioned or contested to justify their
assertions. Justications may involve the presentation of a proof of the
proposition or an argument for it, and such presentations may also be le-
gal utterances. In some multi-agent system applications of dialogue games,
e.g. [2]), sincerity conditions are imposed on utterances, for example al-
lowing agents to assert statements only when they themselves have a prior
argument or proof from their own knowledge base.
Combination Rules: Rules which dene the dialogical contexts under which
particular locutions are permitted or not, or obligatory or not. For instance,
it may not be permitted for a participant to assert a proposition  and sub-
sequently the proposition : in the same dialogue, without in the interim
having retracted the former assertion. Similarly, if one participant chal-
lenges a prior statement made by another participant, that latter participant
may be required to defend the prior statement with specic locutions.
3
Commitments: Rules which dene the circumstances under which partici-
pants express commitment to a proposition. Typically, assertion of a claim
 in the debate is dened as indicating to the other participants some de-
gree of willingness to defend it in the dialogue if questioned or contested by
other participants. Since [11], it is common to track commitments in a set
of publicly-readable blackboards called Commitment Stores.
Termination Rules: Rules which dene the circumstances under which the
3
As an example of a combination rule in the deliberation dialogue protocol presented in the
previous section, the locution prefer(P
i
; a; b) cannot be uttered unless previous speakers
have already uttered two or more locutions in which evaluations are made of the action-
options a and b, i.e., in which a and b are referenced in propositions e and f respectively in
locutions assert(P
j
; evaluation ; e) and assert(P
k
; evaluation ; f).
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dialogue ends. These rules may be expressible in terms of the contents of the
Commitment Stores of one or more participants; for example, a persuasion
dialogue may terminate when all participants utter a locution accepting
the proposition at issue, a locution which inserts the proposition into the
agent's Commitment Store.
In the dialogue game tradition in philosophy, commitment is a dialogical con-
cept [11]: a commitment expresses a willingness by an agent to defend in the
dialogue a claim which that agent has previously asserted, and does not nec-
essarily have any connection to any reality external to the dialogue. Thus,
for example, assertion of some proposition in a dialogue by a participant does
not necessarily mean that this participant believes the asserted proposition
outside the dialogue.
4
Dialogue locutions will only have connections with ex-
ternal reality if the participants in the dialogue together agree to vest such
meanings in the locutions. However, for dialogues of interest to agent design-
ers, particularly negotiations and deliberations, connections between locutions
and external reality is important. For example, parties to a negotiation di-
alogue may agree that its successful conclusion will lead to the execution of
a purchase transaction following dialogue termination. We therefore assume
that participants to a dialogue may utter locutions which all participants un-
derstand to imply a willingness to execute an action or actions, external and
subsequent to the dialogue.
5
We further assume that these actions may be
expressed in the same logical language as are the topics of discussion.
3 A Geometric Semantics
In this section, we develop a geometric semantics for the framework just pre-
sented. We use R
+
and Z
+
to denote spaces consisting of all non-negative real
numbers and integers, respectively. We use the notation R
n+
for the n-fold
product of R
+
, i.e. the sub-space of R
n
where all points have non-negative
co-ordinates on each dimension.
3.1 Dialectical systems
We assume a nite set A = fP
i
ji = 1; : : : ; pg, of dialogue participants, or
agents. We denote dialogue games by possibly-subscripted upper case script
Roman letters, D; E , etc. Each dialogue game comprises a nite set of legal
locution-types, denoted L = fL
j
jj = 1; : : : ; lg, and a number of rules which
4
In [30, p. 72], such commitments are called propositional.
5
In [23], we formalize these two notions of commitment, dialogical and semantic. Since
a suÆciently clever agent can always simulate insincerely any required mental state, the
problem of semantic verication of agent communications languages { how may we verify
that all participants have the same sincere understanding of utterances? { is a thorny one,
which we do not discuss here. For further details, see: [33]. As an example, Durrenmatt's
novel \Die Panne" [6] concerns a human conversation to which the participants give very
dierent meanings, with tragic consequences.
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we will consider presently. Dialogues conducted according to the rules of a
dialogue game are assumed to concern a xed, nite set  = f
i
ji = 1; : : : ; qg
of well-formed formulae in some propositional language, which we call the uni-
verse of discourse.
6
Some or all of these propositions may represent external
actions which can be the subject of commitments incurred by speakers in the
dialogue uttering specic locutions, and so we distinguish a specic subset

a
 , which we call the action set.
We further assume that all locution types can be categorized into one or
more of three types: (a) Commitment locutions: locutions which express some
external or dialogical commitment, e.g. a commitment to execute a purchase
action upon completion of the dialogue; these locutions are instantiated with
one or more elements from 
a
and possibly one or more elements of  n 
a
;
(b) Information locutions: locutions which transmit some information from
speaker to audience, e.g. a statement by a speaker of a preference-ordering over
some set of objects; these locutions are instantiated with one or more elements
of  n 
a
; and (c) Procedural locutions: locutions which neither transmit
information, nor commit to actions; such locutions may, for instance, encode
a theory of argumentation, e.g. questions to or challenges of other speakers,
etc; these locutions are not directly instantiated with elements of , although
they may be instantiated with other locutions in which elements of  appear.
We assume that utterances of dialogue locutions occur at discrete time-
points, called rounds, represented by the non-negative integers. A locution
is executed by a speaker P
i
instantiating the appropriate locution type L
j
with: a positive integer representing the time of utterance (a time-stamp);
the identier P
i
of the speaker of the locution; and possibly a proposition 
k
from the set .
7
We thus denote a locution L
j
instantiated in this way by:
L
j
(t; P
i
; 
k
). The actions referred to by instantiated utterances of Commit-
ment locutions and the information transmitted by instantiated utterances of
Information locutions are assumed to be expressible in formulae contained in
the set . Because some locutions may require instantiation with more than
one proposition, e.g. a locution expressing a preference ordering over two pur-
chase options in a negotiation, we assume  is closed under the combinations
of propositions required by the syntax of the locution-types. We denote by L

the nite set of locution-types L instantiated with possible speakers from A
and discussion topics from . In other words, L

is isomorphic to a subset of
the nite set of 3-tuples, f (L;A;) g.
In the previous section we identied the dierent types of rules in our
model of a dialogue game. Because initiation of a dialogue of specic type
6
Of course, such a propositional language may have an innite set of well-formed formulae.
We leave discussion of the innite case to another occasion.
7
Some dialogue-game protocols, e.g., [24], permit speakers to target utterances at partic-
ular audiences, in which case the locution-type would also be instantiated with a subset of
A. For simplicity in this paper, we assume all utterances are intended for, and heard by,
all participants.
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on a specic topic happens outside it, we do not assume commencement rules
are part of the denition of the dialogue game protocol. For all other rules,
however, it is possible to dene each rule as a mapping from appropriate
dialogue histories (the instantiated locutions actually uttered prior to the next
round) to the set L

in the case of Combination and Termination rules, or to
the set , in the case of Commitment rules. Details of these denitions can
be found in [23]. For present purposes, it is suÆcient to note that a dialogue
game protocol includes a specication of such mappings, and that they induce
a partition of the possible instantiated locutions for each agent at each round:
Obligatory moves: instantiated locutions, one of which must be uttered by
the agent at the next round; Legal moves: instantiated locutions which may
be uttered by the agent at the next round; Forbidden moves: instantiated
locutions which may not be uttered by the agent at the next round; and
Termination moves: instantiated locutions which if uttered by the agent at
the next round will result in termination of the dialogue. We next dene a
dialectical system.
Denition 3.1 Suppose A is a nite set of agents,  a nite set of topics
of discussion (including a possible subset of action commitments), and D a
dialogue game protocol with a set of locutions L. We say that the 4-tuple
~
D = (A;;L;D) is a dialectical system. If the size of A is p, the size of  is q
and the size of L is l, we say that
~
D has dimension n = pql. A dialogue under-
taken in accordance with such a dialectical system is a time-ordered sequence
of locutions uttered by the agents in A, each element of which consists of an
instantiated locution from the set L

, uttered in accordance with the rules of
dialogue game D.
We refer to dialogues undertaken in accordance with a dialectical system
as being associated with or under the dialectical system. We also refer to
such dialogues as legal dialogues, although we do not permit sequences of
locutions under a dialectical system which do not conform to the rules of the
corresponding dialogue game. In the next section, we present a geometric
semantics for dialogue systems and their associated dialogues.
3.2 Dialogue paths
Let
~
D = (A;;L;D) be a dialectical system, and set n = pql, where these
constants are dened as in Section 3.1. We interpret the associated dialogues
as paths in the real n-dimensional space R
n+
. We do this by labeling each
axis of R
n+
with a triple (P
i
; 
k
; L
j
), for all P
i
2 A, for all 
k
2  and for all
L
j
2 L. The path corresponding to a dialogue, which we call a dialogue path,
commences from the origin, and proceeds as follows: Whenever participant P
i
utters
locution L
j
concerning topic 
k
, the path moves from whatever is its
current position forward one unit in a direction parallel to the axis labeled
8
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(P
i
; 
k
; L
j
). We rst dene such paths formally as follows:
Denition 3.2 A dialogue path is a function d(:) : R
+
! R
n+
, such that
conditions (a), (b) and (c) are each satised:
(a) d(0) =
~
0;
(b) Either:
(i) For all integers k 2 R
+
, d(k) = (y
1
; y
2
; : : : ; y
n
) where each y
j
2 Z
+
and
P
n
j=1
y
j
= k; or
(ii) There is an integer m  0 such that for all positive integers k  m,
d(k) = (y
1
; y
2
; : : : ; y
n
) where each y
j
2 Z
+
and
P
n
j=1
y
j
= k, and for all
integers k > m, d(k) = d(m);
(c) If x 2 R
+
is not an integer, then d(x) = d([x] + 1), where [x] is the
integer part of x.
Denition 3.3 Let
~
D = (A;;L;D) be a dialectical system, and let d
L
be
an associated dialogue, that is, a possibly-innite time-ordered sequence of
locutions from L instantiated by the topics in , uttered by agents in A
in accordance with the rules of game D. Suppose the t-th element of d
L
is
the instantiated locution L
j
(t; P
i
; 
k
), for t = 1; 2; : : :. The dialogue path
d associated with d
L
is the function d : R
+
! R
n+
obtained by setting
d(0) =
~
0, setting each d(t) equal to: d(t  1)+ (0; : : : ; 0; 1; 0; : : : ; 0), where the
non-zero co-ordinate corresponds to that axis labeled (P
i
; 
k
; L
j
); and where
d(x) = d([x]+1), when x 2 [t 1; t). We say that d is the dialogue path which
corresponds to or matches d
L
.
It is easy to see that such a d is a dialogue path. Thus, for each legal dialogue
we have an associated continuous directed path throughR
n+
, starting from the
origin, made up of straight-line segments each parallel to an axis of the space,
and each one unit in length. Such paths may represent innite (condition b i
of Denition 2) or terminating (condition b ii) dialogues. In the latter case,
we say that the path d is a terminating path with terminal time-point m or
that the path terminates at m, where m is the integer mentioned in condition
(b) (ii) of Denition 2. In this case, we also say the dialogue path is of length
m. If the former case, we say that the path d is non-terminating or innite.
It will be useful to distinguish generic dialogue paths (as dened above) from
those which obey the rules of the dialogue game, D.
Denition 3.4 Let d : R
+
! R
n+
be a dialogue path. Suppose A is a set
of agents of size p,  a set of topics of discussion of size q, and D a dialogue
game protocol with a set of locutions L of size l, with n = pql, such that
there is a legal dialogue between the agents in A concerning the topics in 
and conducted according to the rules of D using the set of locutions L whose
dialogue path matches d. Then we say that d is a dialogue path under or is
legal under the dialectical system (A;;L;D).
9
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In general, not all dialogue paths will correspond to legal dialogues. This
is because the various combination, termination and commitment rules cre-
ate subsets of R
n+
which a legal dialogue path either cannot enter or must
traverse. Because the combination rules typically specify which instantiated
locutions may, may not or must be uttered depending on the previous utter-
ances in the dialogue and the identity of the agent speaking, these forbidden
and obligatory regions will dier at each round in the dialogue. Thus, because
the histories of two dialogues at any one time may be dierent, one dialogue
path may traverse a region which is forbidden to another dialoue path; a di-
alogue path may even traverse a region which is forbidden to itself later or
earlier in the same dialogue. In the sections below we will refer to the Forbid-
den Region and the Termination Region for a dialogue path under particular
dialectical system at a particular time point, with the obvious meanings.
3.3 Path and system equivalence
Because our focus is on specic types of agent interactions, such as negotiations
or persuasions, we are concerned to see what external action commitments
are made in the course of a dialogue, and what information is transferred
between participants to achieve these commitments. We therefore require
some measure of these, which we obtain by rst examining the syntax of each
locution-type.
Denition 3.5 Suppose
~
D = (A;;L;D) is a dialectical system, with L 2 L
a locution-type. We dene the information possibly transferred by speakers
uttering locution L, denoted Poss Info(L), by the set of all possible subsets
of  which could be instantiated into L. Similarly, the actions possibly com-
mitted to by participants uttering locution L, denoted Poss Acts(L), is the
set of all possible subsets of 
a
which could be instantiated as actions in L.
A procedural locution L has Poss Info(L) = Poss Acts(L) = f;g, i.e. the set
containing only the empty set.
For example, the locution with syntax seek price(k; P
i
; ), with k is pos-
itive integer (a time stamp), P
i
2 A an agent, and  2  a proposition,
will have Poss Info(seek price) = ffg j  2 g, i.e. all singleton subsets
of . By contrast, the locution with syntax prefer(k; P
i
; ;  ) with k and
P
i
as before, and with ;  2  propositions, will have Poss Info(prefer) =
ff; g j ;  2 ;  6= g, i.e. all subsets of two distinct elements of .
Thus, Poss Info(seek price) 6= Poss Info(prefer). Thus, each locution denes
a subset of P()  P(
a
). Each utterance of an information-transferring lo-
cution L in a given dialogue is instantiated with the contents of one element
of the subset Poss Info(L) of P(). Considering instantiation leads us to de-
ne the information actually transferred and actions actually committed to
by participants in a given dialogue.
10
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Denition 3.6 Let d be a dialogue path under a dialectical system
~
D =
(A;;L;D), and let d
L
be the corresponding dialogue. We dene the infor-
mation transferred by d, denoted Info(d), as the set of information transferred
by the locutions uttered in d
L
, i.e.
Info(d) = f 2  j 9L
j
(t; P
i
; ) 2 d
L
g.
Likewise, we dene the actions committed to by d, denoted Acts(d), as the set
of action propositions committed to by the speakers of locutions uttered in
d
L
, i.e.
Acts(d) = f 2 
a
j 9L
j
(t; P
i
; ) 2 d
L
g.
Using these denitions, we next dene a notion of \closeness" of two dialogue
paths.
Denition 3.7 Let d; e : R
+
! R
n+
, be two legal dialogue paths under the
same dialectical system (A;;L;D). We say that d is close to e precisely in
the case when both paths are terminating and Info(d) = Info(e) and Acts(d)
= Acts(e).
Note that two close paths may terminate at dierent time-points, i.e. be of
dierent length. We have the following result, whose straightforward proof is
omitted.
Proposition 3.8 The relation of closeness between two legal dialogue paths
is an equivalence relation. 2
We can therefore speak of two dialogue paths d and e under the same dia-
logue system being equivalent, which we denote by d  e. We also refer to the
corresponding dialogues being equivalent. We denote the equivalence class of
a dialogue path d by [d], which we call a path-equivalence. We also have the
following.
Proposition 3.9 For any dialectical system
~
D, the set of path-equivalence
classes of legal dialogue paths under
~
D is nite.
Proof. This result follows from the assumption that the set  is nite. 2
Using the notion of path-equivalence, we now dene a relationship of similarity
between dialectical systems.
Denition 3.10 Suppose
~
D = (A
D
;
D
;L
D
;D) and
~
E = (A
E
;
E
;L
E
; E) are
two dialectical systems of dimension m and n respectively. We say that
~
D is
similar to
~
E if there exists a one-to-one and onto function h : R
m+
! R
n+
11
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such that for every terminating dialogue path d under
~
D there is a terminating
dialogue path e under
~
E with:
h(d) = e,
Info(d) = Info(e),
Acts(d) = Acts(e),
and such that for all dialogue paths e
0
 e under
~
E, there exists a dialogue
path d
0
 d such that h(d
0
) = e
0
.
In other words, two dialogue systems are similar if the rst can be mapped
to the second so that terminating dialogues are mapped to terminating di-
alogues while preserving information-transfers and action-commitments, and
so that equivalent dialogue paths are mapped to equivalent dialogue paths.
Clearly, for such a map h to exist, the two universes of discourse 
D
and 
E
must intersect, as must their respective action subsets. The second condition
in the denition of h, the existence of a d
0
for every e
0
with h(d
0
) = e
0
, may
be considered as analogous to a continuity requirement on h, since dialogue
paths which are close to one another in the second dialectical system are re-
quired to be the images of dialogue paths close to one another in the rst.
As with path-equivalence, our notion of similarity of dialectical systems is an
equivalence relationship, a statement whose straightforward proof we omit.
Proposition 3.11 The relationship  between dialectical systems is an equiv-
alence relation. 2
We can therefore speak of two dialectical systems
~
D and
~
E being equivalent,
denoted
~
D 
~
E . This notion of equivalence of dialectical systems is a global
property dened in terms of the existence of local properties, i.e. similarity
of dialogue paths. Note that the equivalence mapping h maps legal dialogue
paths to legal dialogue paths; since such paths avoid Forbidden Regions in
their respective spaces, then h preserves this structure in mapping R
m+
to
R
n+
.
4 Comparing Dialectical Systems
In this section, we begin with a connection between the equivalence of dialec-
tical systems and the sets of equivalence classes of the dialogue paths under
them.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose
~
D 
~
E are two equivalent dialectical systems. Then
the respective sets of path-equivalence classes generated by legal terminating
dialogue paths under each system are isomorphic.
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Proof. We need to show that there is a one-to-one and onto map between
the two sets of path-equivalence classes. Let  = 
D
[
E
be the union of the
two universes of discourse, and 
a
= 
D
a[
E
a the union of the two subsets
of action propositions. By the denition of path-equivalence, each class in
the set of path-equivalence classes for a specic dialectical system corresponds
to a unique subset of P()  P(
a
), where P(X) is the power set of X.
For each path-equivalence under
~
D, assign to it the path-equivalence under
~
E
corresponding to the same subset of P()  P(
a
). Such a path-equivalence
class under
~
E exists because the equivalence mapping h from
~
D to
~
E preserves
the information transmitted and the actions committed to by each dialogue.
This mapping is one-to-one because each path-equivalence class is associated
with a unique subset of P() P(
a
).
To prove it is onto, suppose, for purposes of contradiction, there is some
path-equivalence class [e] under
~
E which corresponds to a subset of P() 
P(
a
) to which no path-equivalence class under
~
D corresponds. Consider a
dialogue path e in the path-equivalence class [e]. Because
~
D 
~
E , then there
must be a dialogue path d under
~
D such that h(d) = e. Thus, Info(d) =
Info(e) and Acts(d) = Acts(e). But this just means that [d] is associated with
the same subset of P()P(
a
) as is [e], thus contradicting the assumption.2
Proposition 4.1 shows that dialogue equivalence, which is dened in terms of
mappings between real spaces, preserves the structure of the sets of associated
path-equivalence classes. This is really not surprising given the denition of
dialogue equivalence. However, it allows us to deduce the following interesting
corollary:
Proposition 4.2 Suppose
~
D = (A;;L
D
;D) and
~
E = (A;;L
E
; E) are two
dialectical systems of dimension m and n respectively, such that L
E
= L
D
[
fL
0
g. Moreover, suppose that f;g 6= Poss Info(L
0
) 6=
S
L
j
2J
Poss Info(L
j
), for
all J  L
D
. Then
~
D and
~
E are not equivalent.
Proof. If we had
~
D 
~
E then, by Proposition 4.1, we would have an iso-
morphism of the two sets of path-equivalence classes. However, since f;g 6=
Poss Info(L
0
) 6=
S
L
j
2J
Poss Info(L
j
), for all J  L
D
, there is at least one
instantiation of locution L
0
which transfers a non-empty subset of P() not
transferred by any dialogue without this locution. Since the dialogues of sys-
tem
~
D consist only of the locutions in L
D
, we thus have a contradiction. Hence
~
D and
~
E are not equivalent. 2
A similar result applies to dialogue systems which dier only by a locution
which commits to actions not committed to by the other locutions. Moreover,
both results apply if there is more than one locution L
0
2 L
E
n L
D
which
transfers information or commits to actions not possible using the locutions
13
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in L
D
. Similarly, we have the following corollary, whose similar proof we omit.
Proposition 4.3 Suppose
~
D = (A;;L
D
;D) and
~
E = (A;;L
E
; E) are two
dialectical systems of dimension m and n respectively, such that the protocols
D and E dier only by a rule in E which terminates a dialogue under some
conditions. Then
~
D 
~
E only if for each terminating dialogue-path e under E
in which the rule is invoked and leads to termination there is a terminating
dialogue path d under D with Info(d) = Info(e) and Acts(d) = Acts(e). 2
These corollaries are important because they provide us with some guid-
ance for the design of dialogue systems. With them, we know that adding a
locution or a termination rule which transfers information not transferred in
the current set of locutions will create a non-equivalent system, i.e. a dialogue
system in which there will be dialogues transferring dierent information or
committing to dierent actions. Dialogue-system equivalence, as we have de-
ned it here, is not the only criterion one could use for design and assessment
of dialogue game protocols; one may wish to add or not add such locutions
or rules for other reasons, such as overall simplicity or to encode a particular
theory of argumentation [21]. However, we believe dialogue equivalence is an
important criterion and these results give us a purchase on understanding its
implications for dialogue-game protocol design.
5 Finite and Innite Dialogues
Dialogues conducted under a dialogue protocol may terminate after some -
nite number of locutions, or they may, if the protocol rules so allow, continue
indenitely. Since most software agents are intended for real-world applica-
tions, it is unlikely that agents will be permitted by their human principals
to participate in a dialogue indenitely. Every agent will eventually have to
withdraw from a non-terminating dialogue, no matter how desirable the agent
or its principal believes achievement of the dialogue's objectives to be. But
when should a withdrawal occur? To explore this question, we consider the re-
lationship between nite (terminating) and innite dialogues under a protocol.
We do this from the perspective of the Ehrenfeucht-Frasse games of math-
ematical logic [13]. These consider the question of the isomorphism of two
innite structures by assessing whether isomorphisms exist between partial,
nite subsets of the structures.
8
We start by dening the sub-sets of dialogues
under a protocol which terminate within a given number of utterances.
8
The concept of partial, nite isomorphisms between two innite structures was due to
Roland Frasse [10]. Andrzej Ehrenfeucht [7] extended this idea by constructing abstract
games of 2n moves between two players, Duplicator and Spoiler, who alternate in choosing
elements of the two innite structures for a nite number of moves. The objective of
Duplicator is to show that the two structures are isomorphic, while Spoiler has the objective
of showing they are not. Duplicator wins a game of 2n moves if the two subsets of n
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Denition 5.1 Let
~
D be a dialectical system and let n be a positive integer.
Then we dene
~
D
n
to be the set of all legal dialogues conducted under
~
D
which terminate by time t, for 0  t  n. Further, in an abuse of notation,
let [
~
D
n
] denote the set of path-equivalence classes of the dialogues contained
in
~
D
n
, and let [
~
D] denote the set of path-equivalence classes of the dialogues
contained in
~
D. We call [
~
D
n
] a nite path-equivalence class set and [
~
D] the
path-equivalence class set for
~
D .
Then we have the following proposition connecting nite dialogues to all pos-
sible dialogues under a protocol.
Proposition 5.2 Suppose
~
D is a dialectical system. Then there exists m, a
non-negative integer, such that for all integers n > m, [
~
D
n
] is isomorphic to
[
~
D].
Proof. Each element of the set [
~
D] is the equivalence class of some nite
dialogue under
~
D; such a dialogue must eventually terminate and thus be
included in [
~
D
n
], for some n. But the set [
~
D] is nite, by Proposition 2. The
result follows. 2
As a corollary to this proposition, we can show that equivalent dialectical sys-
tems eventually have isomorphic nite path-equivalence class sets.
Proposition 5.3 Suppose
~
D 
~
E are two equivalent dialectical systems. Then
there exists m, a non-negative integer, such that for all integers n > m, [
~
D
n
]
is isomorphic to [
~
E
n
].
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assuming the result is not true means
that for every positive integer m, there exists a larger integer n such that [
~
D
n
]
is not isomorphic to [
~
E
n
]. But the two dialectical systems are equivalent,
and so their respective (innite) path-equivalence class sets are isomorphic
(Proposition 4). But both these sets are nite (Prop. 2). Thus, there must
eventually be some integer value m after which neither of the respective se-
quences of nite path-equivalence sets increases in size. Thus, both sequences
must converge on the innite sets after a nite time, which contradicts the
assumption that not all such pairs are isomorphic. 2
Recall that the path-equivalence classes are dened in terms of information
transmitted or action commitments incurred in the course of a dialogue. Thus,
if an agent's objectives are dened in such terms | receipt or transfer of
information, or incurrence of an action commitment | then Proposition 7
says that every possible dialogue objective is achievable in some dialogue or
elements selected by the players from the two parent structures are isomorphic. Spoiler wins
otherwise. If the two innite structures are in fact isomorphic, then a winning strategy exists
for Duplicator for the game of size 2n, for every nite n. However, the converse need not be
true, as one could readily imagine isomorphisms existing between every pair of equal-sized
nite subsets without there being an (innite) isomorphism between the parent structures.
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other in a nite time. Of course, although consoling, this may provide no
guidance to an agent now engaged in a particular dialogue about whether to
continue or to leave; we hope to return to this question in future, perhaps
linking it to recent research in AI on the reconsideration of agent intentions
[34].
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have dened a novel geometric semantics for dialogue game
protocols for interactions between autonomous agents and begun to explore its
formal properties. We have used these properties to show that two protocols
which dier only in one locution are not equivalent if that additional locution
transmits information or commits its speaker to actions which are not express-
ible by any combination of the other locutions. We have also begun to explore
relationships between nite and innite dialogues. Although our methods are
not sophisticated mathematically, we believe our results are important be-
cause of the formal guidance they provide for the design and evaluation of
dialogue game protocols. We believe this application domain contains further
potential for investigation. In addition to the questions raised above, there
are two other issues on which we are focused. Firstly, in the work presented
here we have not used the fact that dialogue paths are time-directed. The
recent theory of directed homotopies, or dihomotopies [8,27], which has arisen
in applying algebraic topology to problems of concurrency in theoretical com-
puter science, may be relevant as we consider the time-direction of dialogues.
Secondly, we believe the results of this paper could be readily expressed in
category-theoretic terms; indeed, category theory may provide a more elegant
means to abstract away from non-essential features of a protocol, and to reason
about classes of protocols. We are pursuing both these lines of inquiry.
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